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December 2000
The Family Transition Program
Final Report on Florida's Initial Time-Limited Welfare Program

Dan Bloom, James J. Kemple, Pamela Morris, Susan Scrivener, Nandita Verma, Richard Hendra
with
Diana Adams-Ciardullo, David Seith, Johanna Walter

In 1994, the State of Florida launched the Family Transition Program (FTP), the nation’s first experiment with welfare time limits. Today, almost all states have established time limits on cash assistance benefits, either for adults or for entire families, and the 1996 federal welfare law has imposed a nationwide 60-month time limit on federally funded benefits (with limited exceptions). FTP has attracted national attention, both because it anticipated key elements of later federal and state welfare reforms — even today, relatively few families nationwide have reached a time limit – and because it is one of the few programs of its kind that has been subject to a rigorous evaluation, including an assessment of effects on participants’ children.

            This is the final report in a six-year independent evaluation of FTP conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) under a contract with the Florida Department of Children and Families, with funding from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Ford Foundation, and the other organizations listed at the front of the report.

            FTP, which operated until late 1999 in Escambia County (which includes the city of Pensacola), limited most families to 24 months of welfare receipt in any 60-month period (the least job-ready were limited to 36 months of receipt in any 72-month period). The program also provided an unusually rich array of services, supports, and financial work incentives designed to help welfare recipients prepare for, find, and keep jobs. Florida’s current statewide welfare program includes similar time limits and financial work incentives, but differs from FTP in other key respects; thus, the evaluation is not assessing the state’s current program.

            To assess what difference FTP made, the evaluation compared the experiences of two groups: the FTP group, whose members were subject to the program, and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) group, whose members were subject to the prior welfare rules. To ensure that the groups would be comparable, welfare applicants and recipients (most of them single mothers) were assigned at random to one or the other group. Because the two groups had similar kinds of people, any differences that emerged between the groups during the study’s follow-up period can reliably be attributed to FTP rather than to differences in personal characteristics or changes in the external environment. These differences are known as program impacts. The study focused on about 2,800 people who were assigned to the FTP and AFDC groups in 1994 and early 1995, tracking each person for at least four years after they entered the study.

            The FTP evaluation differs in one key respect from many earlier random assignment studies, in which individuals subject to a mandatory welfare-to-work program were compared to people in a “control group” that was not required to participate in employment services (but could do so voluntarily). In this case, many members of the AFDC group were subject to such mandates, in accordance with rules that existed before FTP began. Thus, the study is assessing what difference FTP made above and beyond the effects of Florida’s pre-existing welfare-to-work program.

Findings in Brief

            FTP’s results were affected by the unusual environment in which it operated – a period of low unemployment, highly publicized changes in state and national welfare policies, and an unprecedented 70 percent decline in Florida’s welfare caseload. These factors shaped the outcomes of the AFDC group — many of whom left welfare without the program — and left little room for FTP to generate large impacts. In addition, FTP was forced to begin operations very quickly, with little time for planning, and early enrollees (who are the focus of the study) entered the program before it was running smoothly. For these reasons, the evaluation results represent a conservative estimate of the program’s potential. Nevertheless, FTP produced several important effects:

  • On average, over the four-year study period, FTP increased employment and earnings, reduced welfare receipt, and modestly increased participants’ income.

            Reflecting the rapid decline in Florida’s welfare caseload, 96 percent of the AFDC group left welfare, at least temporarily, during the follow-up period, and less than 20 percent were receiving benefits at the end of the period. Nevertheless, owing in large part to its time limit, FTP substantially reduced long-term welfare receipt: only 6 percent of the FTP group received benefits for more than 36 months, compared with 17 percent of the AFDC group.

            The FTP group received, on average, about $700 (15 percent) less cash assistance than the AFDC group and $500 (8 percent) less in Food Stamps over the four years. The FTP group’s earnings were about $2,400 higher, on average — more than offsetting their losses in public assistance. Thus, compared with the AFDC group, the FTP group had about $1,200 (5 percent) more income from these sources over the four years and derived a greater fraction of its income from earnings and a smaller share from public assistance.

  • The pattern of results changed over time: At the end of the follow-up period, the FTP group was less likely to be receiving welfare, but no more likely to be working, and the two groups had the same average income.

            FTP’s positive effects on employment and income were concentrated in years 2 and 3 of the follow-up period. During year 4, the AFDC group “caught up,” and the two groups were equally likely to be working at the end of period. The FTP group was substantially less likely to be receiving welfare at the end, but the impact on welfare payments was small in dollar terms because neither group received much cash assistance by that point. As a result, the two groups had about the same combined income from earnings and public assistance in the last few months of follow-up.

  • At the end of the four-year period, there were few differences between the groups on most measures of economic well-being, although, on a few indicators, the FTP group’s living conditions appeared to be slightly better.

            At the four-year point, members of the FTP group were somewhat less likely to report having multiple housing problems and more likely to report that they usually had at least enough money to make ends meet. Otherwise, however, there were few effects on a range of measures of material hardship. FTP also did not affect marriage, fertility, or health insurance coverage. Most people in both groups were off welfare and working at the end of follow-up, but wages were low, and economic conditions were poor for many families: Nearly two-thirds of each group reported that they had experienced at least one serious material hardship in the past year — for example, being unable to pay their full rent or having their telephone disconnected.

  • The increases in employment, earnings, and income were concentrated among less disadvantaged participants.

            Among those least at risk of long-term welfare receipt (based on their employment and welfare history and other characteristics measured at enrollment), the FTP group had about $4,200 (19 percent) more earnings and $3,200 (11 percent) more income than the AFDC group over the four-year period. In contrast, FTP barely affected employment, earnings, or income for those most at risk of long-term receipt. For a small group facing particularly serious barriers to employment, FTP appears to have reduced income: reductions in public assistance benefits —driven in part by the time limit — were larger than increases in earnings.

  • On average, FTP had few effects for young children, but it had a couple of negative impacts on school outcomes for adolescents.

            Among children who were 5 to 12 years old at the four-year follow-up, FTP children were more likely than their AFDC group peers to be in child care, and their parents were more likely to receive child care subsidy assistance. FTP children were also more likely to be cared for and to receive financial support from their noncustodial fathers. On measures of parenting and child well-being, however, there were few differences between the two groups. For FTP adolescents, there was a negative impact on school performance and an increased likelihood of being suspended.

  • Surprisingly, FTP had some negative effects on children in the least disadvantaged families — the subgroup with the largest earnings impacts.

            According to parental reports, FTP children in the families least at risk of long-term welfare receipt had lower levels of school performance than their AFDC group peers and were more likely to have been suspended from school. These effects were found for all school-age children, not just adolescents. A detailed analysis focusing on the small sample of 5- to 12-year-olds in this subgroup found that FTP parents supervised their children less closely than AFDC parents, perhaps because they were more likely to be working near the end of the follow-up period. Notably, for the most disadvantaged families (who were most likely to reach the time limit), FTP had no impact, either positive or negative, on child well-being.

  • Only about one-sixth of FTP participants reached the time limit; most of these families struggled financially after losing their benefits, but did not appear to be worse off than many other families who left welfare for other reasons.

            Only 17 percent of the FTP group reached the time limit in the study period; most of the others left welfare and did not accumulate 24 or 36 months of benefit receipt. Another 7 percent would have reached the limit (they received at least 24 or 36 months of benefits), but some of their months of receipt were not counted, usually because they were granted a medical exemption.

            Almost all of those who actually reached the time limit had their benefits canceled, and fewer than half of these individuals worked steadily in the post-time-limit period. In-depth interviews found that many relied heavily on family, friends, Food Stamps, and housing assistance. Few experienced the most severe hardships — homelessness or hunger — and most, whether working or not, struggled to make ends meet. In this respect, families who reached the time limit were similar to many other families in both groups who left welfare for other reasons.
  • FTP’s focus on intensive case management and services was expensive, and the welfare savings generated by the program were not large enough to offset the substantial upfront costs.

            Saving money for taxpayers was not a central goal of FTP. Florida initially approached time-limited welfare cautiously, giving FTP almost unlimited funding for staffing, services, and supports to ensure that FTP participants could achieve self-sufficiency. Thus, the program’s net cost (the cost of FTP over and above what was spent on the AFDC group) was high relative to other welfare-to-work programs — nearly $8,000 per person over five years. Offsetting welfare savings were limited because most of the AFDC group left assistance without the program.

Implications

            Time limits have been among the most controversial features of state and federal welfare reforms in the 1990s but, as of late 2000, Escambia County is one of only a few places where families have reached a time limit and had their benefits canceled. On average, FTP’s combination of intensive services, work incentives, and time limits substantially decreased long-term welfare receipt while modestly increasing participants’ income. Moreover, the results are probably a conservative estimate of FTP’s potential because the AFDC group was influenced to some extent by the welfare reform environment. Perhaps most important, the FTP experience shows that, under certain circumstances at least, time limits can be implemented without causing the widespread severe consequences predicted by some critics of the policy.

            But caution is in order. First, FTP’s results were not uniformly positive. It appears that a group of families lost income as a result of FTP, and the program generated negative effects for some groups of children. In addition, the follow-up was too short to allow final conclusions to be drawn about the families whose benefits were canceled at the time limit: Their complex coping strategies may or may not be sustainable over the long term, particularly if the labor market weakens. Finally, while there is little evidence that FTP made a large number of families much worse off, the program also has not yielded the dramatic positive impacts that were anticipated by some proponents of time limits during the national welfare reform debate.

            Second, it is critical to consider the unique circumstances under which FTP operated: far from any large city, in a healthy economic climate, with ample resources for staff and services. Moreover, some recipients facing very serious barriers to employment (for example, health problems) were exempted from the time limit, and those who were cut off lost relatively little money (because Florida’s welfare grant levels are low). These circumstances may have left little room for FTP to achieve large positive effects (because most of the AFDC group left welfare without the program), but they also reduced the chances that the program would cause serious harm to vulnerable families.


Funders

MDRC's evaluation of Florida's Family Transition Program (FTP) was funded by a contract with the Florida Department of Children and Families and with support from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Ford Foundation.

The study of FTP also benefited from the support of the Project on State-Level Child Outcomes, which is co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE). Additional federal funding to support the project was provided by the Centers for Disease Control, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and U.S. Department of Agriculture. Private foundation funding has been provided by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, George Gund Foundation, and Smith Richardson Foundation.


The findings and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily represent the official positions or policies of the funders.
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