Using data from an evaluation of two welfare-to-work programs in Riverside, Calif. and Grand Rapids, Mich., we find that requirements to participate in mandatory welfare-to-work programs can increase employment and earnings and reduce welfare income, independent of actual participation in the welfare-to-work program. Usually, these independent effects of the participation requirements are not captured by estimates of welfare-to-work program impacts, because program impacts are measured conditional on the actual showing up of those required to participate. In our analyses, we find larger effects of the mandate for welfare recipients who are more “job-ready” and for programs operating in healthier labor markets. We also find evidence that response to a mandate increases with the strength of enforcement and the level of penalties for noncompliance. Following welfare reform legislation of 1996, compliance requirements for welfare-to-work programs have become stricter and penalties for non-compliance have increased. Consequently, we expect the effects of these mandates to strengthen.

The authors are grateful for the thoughtful comments of Audrey Mirsky-Ashby and Howard Rolston (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) and Andrew Lauland (U.S. Department of Education), as well as careful reading by Barbara Goldman, Gayle Hamilton, and David Butler of MDRC. Work on this paper was supported by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as part of the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS). MDRC is conducting the NEWWS Evaluation under contract No. HHS-100-89-0030. Findings presented do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders, and all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.